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BOOK REVIEW
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: PIRACY WITH
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
Glenn R. Buttertont
To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION. By William P. Aford.t Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press. 1995. 222 pp. $39.50.
In the early 1920s, the American publisher G. & C. Merriam, hav-
ing made a hefty investment in a bilingual version of its celebrated
Webster's Dictionary for the Chinese market, discovered that a Shang-
hai publisher had distributed its own unauthorized Chinese version of
the dictionary even before Merriam's had been released. Merriam
sued in a Chinese court under the copyright and trademark provisions
of a 1903 treaty between the U.S. and China, but got no satisfaction: it
received a modest damage award but was unable to prevent continued
publication of the offending Chinese work.' This is an old, and clas-
sic, Sino-American case of infringement of intellectual property rights.
Nearly a century later, things have only gotten worse. Today, theft
through piracy or counterfeiting is rampant in China. The long list of
injured parties includes such household names as Microsoft, Apple,
Disney, Paramount Pictures, and Mars, and the copied materials in-
clude such highly profitable items as Windows software, the M & Ms
logo, Mickey Mouse figures, Terminator II videocassettes, and Ma-
donna CDs.
The history of intellectual property relations between the U.S.
and China over the last century has been a tortured one, and the Web-
ster's case is but one telling episode. William P. Afford recounts this
and other colorful cases in a wide-ranging work on intellectual prop-
erty law in Chinese civilization. Alford, who currently serves as the
Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School, has pro-
duced a carefully crafted analysis which is historically rich and full of
important new material. This is serious scholarship, yet the author's
t Lecturer in Law and Bigelow Fellow, University of Chicago. A.B., MA, Ph.D., Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; M.Phil., Cambridge University; J.D., Columbia University.
I Alford is the Henry Stimson Professor of Law and the Director of East Asian Legal
Studies at Harvard Law School.
I WmLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLEcrUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW IN CHINESE CMLIZATION 43 (1995).
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thoroughness is engaging rather than tedious, his style lively, not anti-
septic. The book is also timely. For those who have followed
America's trade wars in the headlines-with either lay interest or ex-
pert insight-this accessible and authoritative work will add sense to
the sometimes shrill'rhetoric that has flowed from such U.S. trade war-
riors as Charlene Barshefsky, Mickey Kantor and Carla Hills.
As the U.S. trade deficit with the rest of the world began to bal-
loon dramatically during the Reagan years, policy makers focused on
the widespread piracy of U.S. intellectual property abroad, the bulk of
which occurred in the Third World. The assumption that came to
shape Washington's trade posture-one which Alford and others
question-was that enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights
abroad could be achieved by exerting pressure in the form of trade
sanctions; once piracy was extinguished, or at least sharply reduced,
Third World markets thus freed from inexpensive counterfeits would
be ripe for genuine, Made-in-the-U.SA. goods with prices to match,
which would help balance the U.S. trade deficit.2
In the late 1980s, China became the world's leading pirate, leap-
frogging other notorious offenders such as Taiwan, South Korea, Bra-
zil, India, Thailand, Indonesia and Hong Kong. More recently, the
destinations of Chinese counterfeits have become of even greater con-
cern than their mushrooming volume. China has become an export
platform for piracy, especially illicitly copied compact discs, which
have become huge cash cows.
Today China remains the world's pre-eminent pirate, despite
signing-under threat of quite substantial trade sanctions-two major
agreements with the U.S. in 1992 and 1995. In those agreements,
China pledged to undertake stiff measures to curb piracy, make deep
reforms in its domestic intellectual property laws, and accede to lead-
ing international intellectual property conventions. Ironically, even
though the Middle Kingdom followed through on many of these com-
mitments, piracy has not abated, and China now appears to be an in-
corrigible international outlaw. Why should this be?
In a book-length answer, Alford argues that brute attempts to
transplant alien private property and rule-of-law concepts from the
U.S. into the cultural and legal environment of mainland China are
bound to fail. He explains, in a discussion that spans Chinese history
from the beginning of the imperial era (221 B.C.) to modern times,
how Chinese culture in key respects is very different from our own.
Three elements figure prominently: Confucian tradition, resentment
of foreigners, and the oppressive character of Communist Party rule,
both past and present.
2 Id. at 113-15.
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Confucian China, in both the content and administration of its
laws, was family-centered. Many laws were deeply concerned with of-
fenses against the family, while in administration the law relied for its
execution on family structures and relationships largely unknown in
the West. In general, problem-solving and dispute resolution took
place informally within the family or in extended family environments
such as the guild or the larger community, not formally through West-
ern-style government-sponsored courts or agents. 3 Historically, the
Emperor did not, and logistically could not, provide an administrative
infrastructure capable of coping with such problems.4 Thus, Western-
style legal institutions and rule-of-law traditions played at most a mar-
ginal role in motivating and rationalizing conduct in Confucian
China. Inasmuch as contemporary international intellectual property
standards rely on those Western institutions and traditions, Chinese
with a Confucian world view will find them at best alien and at worst
entirely opaque.
A related Confucian element that Alford finds important to the
Confucian world view is a backward-looking custom of literary refer-
ence to ancestors, past values, and institutions.5 Copying or imitation
in this fashion is commonplace in classical Chinese poetry and litera-
ture and is mirrored in Chinese painting and calligraphy. Such be-
havior is construed not as it might be in the West as plagiarism or
piracy or the unauthorized use of private property, but as the expres-
sion and reinforcement of community values.
As for Chinese resentment of foreigners, the second of the more
prominent elements in Alford's analysis, he sketches a tidy historical
framework that begins with the 1744 establishment in Canton and Ma-
cao of part-time official enclaves for foreign traders ("barbarians"),
followed by the Qianlong Emperor's famous 1793 rebuff of an at-
tempt by King George III to establish formal diplomatic and trade
relations: "We possess all things. I set no value on objects strange or
ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures."6 British
traders, frustrated by their inability to sell manufactured goods to the
Chinese, initiated profitable sales of Indian opium, wholly ignoring
the entreaties of the Chinese government to quit the drug trade. Fol-
lowing a decisive Chinese defeat in the Opium War of 1839-1842, Brit-
ain and other nations gained important concessions. Notably, a
system of extraterritoriality was established under which foreigners ac-
cused of crimes against Chinese subjects would be tried according to
their own nation's laws by representatives of their home government
3 Id. at 10-12.
4 Id. at 11.
5 Id. at 25-29.
6 Id. at 30.
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resident in China.7 The injustices that extraterritoriality perpetrated
on the Chinese left them with considerable resentment toward for-
eign, particularly Western, legal systems.
Foreign claims of infringement of intellectual property rights be-
gan to mount in the late nineteenth century with the steady expansion
of trade. In a series of agreements negotiated in 1902 and 1903, the
Chinese, wooed by the prospect of terminating extraterritoriality,
agreed to provide protection for foreign trademarks and, for the
United States, patents as well." But for years afterward the Chinese
resisted pressure from the U.S. to implement the treaties. Alford ar-
gues that China lost its enthusiasm for enacting implementing legisla-
tion when it became apparent that the foreign powers had no interest
in hastening the demise of extraterritoriality.9
The third prominent element in Alford's analysis belongs to the
Communist portion of the modem era. During the rule of the Kuo-
mintang, following the 1911 revolution, ambitious but unsuccessful
attempts were made to create effective Western-style statutes. How-
ever, under the Communists, who seized power on the mainland in
1949, Chinese intellectual property law took a predictably different
tack, aptly expressed in a popular folksaying of the late 1960s: "Is it
necessary for a steel worker to put his name on a steel ingot that he
produces in the course of his duty? If not, why should a member of
the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what he
produces?" 10 Mimicking legal developments in the Soviet Union, the
Chinese began to establish a statutory framework for intellectual prop-
erty law incorporating material incentives as early as 1950,11 but even
this Marxist creation disintegrated in the course of the rabid political
campaigns of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) when piracy was rife,
and lawyers and legal institutions were abolished.12 In 1975, even
before the end of the Cultural Revolution, substantial efforts were
made to begin rebuilding the country's legal infrastructure, and, by
1977, its intellectual property laws as well. In 1979 the world wit-
nessed the initiation of Deng Xiaoping's sweeping economic reforms
and, in the decade and a half since, a breathtaking Chinese economic
expansion, which has carried such official labels as "socialist market
economy" and "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Shadowing
that expansion has been a similarly dramatic growth in what one
might call piracy with Chinese characteristics.
7 Id. at 33.
8 Id. at 36-49.
9 Id. at 49.
10 Id. at 56.
11 Id. at 56-61.
12 Id. at 63-65.
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If residues of Confucianism and xenophobia do linger in the con-
temporary Chinese sensibility, how do they dovetail with modem for-
eign efforts to bring Chinese intellectual property practices up to
world standards? In Alford's view, recent U.S. strategies have failed to
curb Chinese piracy because they have relied on pressure tactics-
threats of trade sanctions, and the withdrawal of support for Chinese
accession to GATT and the World Trade Organization-and suc-
ceeded only in coercing China into making superficial changes in its
laws and institutions, rather than deep changes in its political and so-
cial culture.' 3 Despite the dramatic socio-economic reforms that have
so altered the face of Chinese culture since 1979, ordinary citizens
remain subject to an intensely politicized world. Under their own do-
mestic law, for example, the Chinese do not enjoy freedom of expres-
sion or full Western-style rights to possess and manipulate property,
including intellectual property. Instead, the state determines which
property may be possessed and which ideas may be disseminated.
Moreover, citizens appearing in court enjoy no fundamental proce-
dural rights, and rulings of the Chinese judiciary are made not inde-
pendently but at the direction of state and Party officials. As a result,
the Chinese lack the "rights consciousness" within which it makes
sense to respect and protect the intellectual property rights of
individuals.' 4
To exacerbate the problem, much of the general population has
become quite disenchanted with the Communist Party, owing to a
mind-numbing fatigue borne of endless political campaigns, and is
therefore bound to be deeply cynical about the true aims behind any
new law or pronouncement. Indeed, the perception is widespread
that the East-West ideological struggle has long since vanished, that
the Party has become thoroughly corrupt, and that the leadership
makes its decisions not on the basis of what is good for the country but
on the basis of how it will most likely retain political power. Most
Chinese, being savvy and pragmatic, have concluded that they, too,
had better get what they can, when and how they can, even through
piracy or other illegal means. In such an environment, believes Al-
ford, it makes little sense to ask ordinary Chinese to adhere to a sys-
tem of abstract laws governing patents, copyrights, and trademarks
whose main purpose is to protect the rights and increase the wealth of
foreigners.' 5
IS Id. at 117-18. For commentary on recent efforts to impose such sanctions through
denial of Most Favored Nation trading privileges, see Glenn R. Butterton, Renew MFN for
China? Right Decision, Wrong Reasons, CHi. TuB., July 3, 1996, at 27.
14 ALFoRD, supra note 1, at 117-20.
15 Id. at 118-19.
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Thus, even though China has reformed its domestic intellectual
property laws and signed a host of international intellectual property
agreements, it has not developed the kinds of institutions and values
in its citizenry that will lead to meaningful and lasting changes in their
behavior. In Taiwan, by contrast, Alford observes that piracy has been
considerably curtailed and argues that this is a result of deep changes
in political institutions and the creation of indigenous intellectual
property industries. 16 He concludes, in effect, that unless U.S. negoti-
ators change their tactics in hopes of bringing about similar and en-
during changes in Chinese practices and attitudes, they will be left
with still more superficial agreements and little else.
Some readers may be left questioning the true impact of Con-
fucianism and nineteenth century xenophobia on modern day Chi-
nese sensibilities, and some may believe the Chinese to have made
more progress than Alford suggests on the road toward creating insti-
tutions and values that will engender respect for intellectual property,
foreign and domestic.17 But virtually all readers will likely find that he
has produced a unique and thought-provoking work, one which is an
exceptionally valuable contribution to the literature on Chinese law,
intellectual property, and international trade.
16 Id. at 107-11.
17 I have discussed these matters at length elsewhere. See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates,
Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforce-
ment 38 ARuz. L. RExV. (forthcoming 1996).
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